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1. Introduction
Taxes levied on the sale or purchase of real estate are pervasive but little studied. Such taxes
increase the cost of buying or selling a house and to avoid paying these taxes households will
stay in houses that are too big, too small, or too far from their workplace. Hence, we expect these
taxes to reduce the volume of real estate transactions and to entail a welfare loss. By exploiting a
natural experiment arising from Toronto’s imposition of a Land Transfer Tax (LTT) on real estate
purchases in early 2008, we estimate the impact of real estate transfer taxes on the market for
single family homes. Our data show that Toronto’s 1.1% tax caused a 15% decline in the number
of sales and a decline in housing prices about equal to the tax. Relative to an equivalent property
tax, the associated welfare loss is substantial, about $ 1 for every $ 8 in tax revenue according
to our calculation. While the magnitude of the welfare loss from Toronto’s LTT partly reflects
a pre-existing provincial land transfer tax, our estimate is comparable to those associated with
other well recognised interventions in the housing market. For instance, the results of Glaeser and
Luttmer (2003) suggest a welfare loss from rent control in New York above m$ 200 per year. We
obtain about the same figure by extrapolating our finding for Toronto to New York.1 In short, our
estimates suggest that scrapping current LTTs in favour of revenue equivalent property taxes could
result large annual welfare gains.
Most jurisdictions in most developed countries impose land transfer taxes. In the United States
in 2004, 34 states and the District of Columbia imposed some form of property transfer tax, while
for a number of US cities and states, property transfer taxes account for a non-trivial share of
revenue. In Canada most provinces impose a land transfer tax. Australian states levy a similar
tax, as do the UK and France. In spite of the evident importance of land transfer taxes to public
finance, their effects are little studied.
Many other public policies also directly affect the cost of buying and selling property. Most
importantly, a key part of the 2009 US Housing Stimulus Bill is a provision allowing homebuyers
to reduce their taxes by 10 percent of the price of their new home, up to $ 8,000, for a limited
period of time. In effect, this is the opposite of the Toronto LTT (though capped, limited in time,
and dependent on buyer’s income). Also related, California’s Proposition 13 freezes property taxes
when a house changes hands. In an environment where real estate is appreciating, this means that
tax burdens increase when the house changes hands, and thereby drives up transactions costs. Our
results provide a basis for assessing the impact that these sorts of policies will have on real estate
markets and mobility.
Our identification strategy is a variant of the regression discontinuity design. Figures 1 and 2
provide a heuristic introduction to this strategy. The top panel of figure 1 illustrates the relationship
between the LTT and the change in transaction volume between the two six month periods beginning February of 2007 and February 2008. The heavy line in the top panel describes the change
in the number of transactions in an average postal code as the distance from the Toronto border
increases. The dotted lines give 5% and 95% bootstrapped pointwise confidence bounds. As we
1 The

calculation for the welfare loss of rent control in New York for Glaeser and Luttmer is in their working paper
(Glaeser and Luttmer, 1997).
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move left from zero the figure describes suburban postal codes further outside the Toronto border,
as we move right the figure describes downtown postal codes further inside the border. This figure
shows that Toronto residents are less mobile relative to their nearby suburban neighbours after the
imposition of the LTT than before. Details about the construction of figure 1 (and figure 2) are
available in a technical appendix.
The bottom panel of figure 1 shows time series variation in cross-border changes in transaction
volumes. Specifically, this figure considers the a five kilometre band on either side of the Toronto
border and calculates the difference in the number of monthly transactions for an average postal
code in each region each region as a percentage of the Toronto mean. The dots in this figure show
the 44 resulting data points. In this figure we see a spike in transactions volume before the LTT and
sharp decrease afterwards.
Figure 2 is similar to figure 1, but illustrates the relationship between the LTT and prices. The
top panel of figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the LTT and the change in transaction price
between the two six month periods beginning February of 2007 and February 2008. The heavy line
in the top panel describes the change in the price of a transaction in an average postal code as a
percentage of the pre-LTT 2007 price, as the distance from the Toronto border varies. The dotted
lines give 5% and 95% bootstrapped pointwise confidence bounds. As we move left from zero the
figure describes areas farther outside the Toronto border, as we move right the figure describes
areas farther inside. This figure shows little systematic cross-border variation in prices around the
time of the LTT. The bottom panel of figure 2 shows time series variation in cross-border changes
in transaction prices. Specifically, this figure considers the five kilometre band on either side of
the Toronto border and calculates the difference in monthly transaction price for an average postal
code in each region each region as a percentage of the Toronto mean. The dots in this figure show
the 44 resulting data points. In this figure we see a spike in transactions price before the LTT, and
a small decrease afterwards.
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the imposition of the LTT caused two discrete changes in Greater
Toronto real estate market, one on the date the LTT is imposed, and the other at the Torontosuburban municipal boundary. With this said, the shape of the curves illustrated in these figures is
somewhat sensitive to econometric technique. Our econometric strategy relies on an elaboration
of the regression discontinuity design (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001) that exploits both
discontinuities to arrive at robust estimates of the effect of the LTT.

2. Background
A. The Toronto Land Transfer Tax
Expenditures by the Toronto municipal government increased by about 9% between 2006 and
2007. This increase resulted partly from the ‘downloading’ of provincially mandated programs and
partly from a rapid and sustained increase in operating expenditures. The increase in expenditure
was offset by a revenue increase of about 3%. (City of Toronto, 2008). The resulting budget shortfall
was about half a billion dollars.
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Figure 1. Volume of residential real estate transactions across the Toronto border.

Top panel: Vertical axis is change in number of units transacted in an average postal code after the
imposition of the LTT. Horizontal axis is distance from the Toronto municipal border, negative distances
are suburban, positive distances are Toronto. Solid line gives mean percentage change in volume for the
mean postal code as a function of distance. Dotted lines are 95% and 5% bootstrapped pointwise confidence
bounds.
Bottom panel: Vertical axis is percentage change in mean postal code transaction volume from crossing the
Toronto border in the months before and after the imposition of the LTT. Horizontal axis counts months from
the imposition of the LTT, with negative numbers indicating earlier months and positive numbers indicating
later months.
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Figure 2. Price of residential real estate transactions across the Toronto border.

Top panel: Vertical axis is percentage change in the price units transacted in an average postal code after
the imposition of the LTT. Horizontal axis is distance from the Toronto municipal border, negative distances
are suburban, positive distances are Toronto. Solid line gives mean percentage change in price for the mean
postal code as a function of distance. Dotted lines are 95% and 5% bootstrapped pointwise confidence
bounds.
Bottom panel: Vertical axis is percentage change in mean postal code transaction price from crossing the
Toronto border in the months before and after the imposition of the LTT. Horizontal axis counts months from
the imposition of the LTT, with negative numbers indicating earlier months and positive numbers indicating
later months.
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Prior to 2007, Toronto’s budget was usually balanced or even slightly in surplus. The mayoral
election fought late 2006 made barely any mention of budgetary issues. Important issues at the
time were a rising wave of gang-related crime, garbage collection, and waterfront renewal.2 The
incumbent mayor, David Miller, even promised to keep residential property tax increases in line
with inflation. He was ultimately reelected. Therefore, although the city’s budget had been tight
for some time, 2007’s budget deficit surprised most Toronto residents. Furthermore, we note that
this budget shortfall was unique to Toronto because of its unusually generous pay settlement for
city workers the previous year and because the downloading of social expenditure by the Province
affected the city of Toronto more than surrounding municipalities.
Shortly after the election the newly elected Toronto City Council began to address the budget,
and, to keep the mayor’s campaign promise, considered alternative forms of taxation. This was
possible because the ‘City of Toronto Act’ (38th Legislature of Ontario, 2006), which took effect
on January 1, 2007, granted the city of Toronto the authority to impose a number of additional
taxes. Among them was a ‘municipal land transfer tax’. On July 16, 2007 the Toronto City Council
narrowly defeated the implementation of such a tax. Rather, it voted to defer a decision until
October 2007. In response the Mayor announced emergency cuts to municipal services until
additional revenue could be found. The Toronto City Council ultimately approved a land transfer
tax on October 22, 2007.
The land transfer tax affected all real estate transactions which occurred after January 1, 2008,
and closed after February 1, 2008. The final rate schedule for Toronto’s LTT is given in Table 1, along
with the corresponding provincial tax rates. The LTT is paid by the buyer. First-time homebuyers
receive a partial exemption.
Table 1. City of Toronto and Province of Ontario Land Transfer Tax Rates

City of Toronto
Tax Rate by Value ($)
(Effective Feb. 1, 2008)

Province of Ontario
Tax Rate by Value ($)
(Effective May 7, 1997)

LTT

0 − 55,000
55,000 − 400,000
400,000+

LTT

0.5%
1.0%
2.0%

0 − 55,000
55,000 − 250,000
250,000 − 400,000
400,000+

0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%

Sources: Municipal Land Transfer Tax, City of Toronto, http://www.toronto.ca/taxes/mltt.htm; Provincial
Land Transfer Tax, Historical Land Transfer Tax Rates, Province of Ontario. Note: For the Municipal LTT,
exemptions are given to first-time homebuyers for the value of a purchase under $ 400,000 and for the
provincial LTT exemptions are given to first-time home buyers for the value of a purchase under $ 227,500.

We will ultimately estimate the effect of the LTT by comparing the changes to the Greater
Toronto real estate market before and after the imposition of the LTT across the Toronto border.
The validity of this strategy rests on two assumptions. First, that the real estate market did not
2 See for instance the summary and extracts of the main mayoral debate at http://www.citynews.ca/news/news_
4634.aspx.
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anticipate the tax, and second that no other policy change differentially affected the Toronto and
suburban real estate market at the same time as the LTT was imposed.
The evidence suggests that the real estate market could not have anticipated the LTT. The
Toronto City Council considered a number of different taxes as responses to the city’s budget
problems during the fall of 2007, not only a land transfer tax. In addition, the relevant Council
votes were close and uncertain, even on the day of the vote. With this history, it is unlikely that
markets anticipated the LTT.
In spite of this, it is worth asking how our results would be affected if the market did anticipate
the LTT. If participants in the Toronto property market anticipated the LTT before the council vote
in late October 2007, we would expect to see a spike in transactions prior to that date along with
a small decline in prices. In fact, while we observe a significant spike in transactions volume
between the vote of the tax and its the imposition, we do not observe changes in the real estate
market before the vote. This suggests that the market did not anticipate the LTT and hence, that
our empirical strategy is reasonable.3
While we cannot prove that no other event, contemporaneous with the LTT differentially affected Toronto and suburban real estate markets, we can find no evidence for such an event. In
Toronto, the City Council approved the LTT together with a $ 60 municipal supplement to the
vehicle registration fee. This fee is small and only indirectly related to the property market. We
do not think it could plausibly affect it. Property taxes increased by about the same amount in
Toronto and surrounding municipalities.4 Although we note that our theoretical analysis in section
8 suggests that ordinary property tax rates should not affect real estate transaction volumes.
In summary, we are looking at the effect of the unexpected introduction of a new tax affecting Toronto. The revenue generated by this tax was not used to increase service provision but
instead to fill the gap left by an unusually generous pay settlement with city employees and a
rise in expenditure induced by the downloading of provincial expenditure that affected Toronto
disproportionately. Municipalities surrounding Toronto did not face the same need to increase
their revenue, nor were their governments permitted to impose a LTT.
B. Land Transfer Taxes outside Toronto
Most jurisdictions in most developed countries impose land transfer taxes. According to the
Federation of Tax Administrators (Federation of Tax Administrators, 2006), in the United States
in 2004, 34 states and the District of Columbia impose some form of property transfer tax. Among
these, New Hampshire, Delaware, and the District of Colombia have the highest rates, at 1.5%, 2%,
and 2.2%, respectively. Many US municipalities also impose property transfer taxes, often at rates
equal to or higher than those imposed by the states. For example, Chicago’s land transfer tax is
3 Alternatively, it could be that residents knew well before October 2007 that local taxation would increase significantly (through, say, property taxation or user fees) but that the choice of the LTT as an instrument to address the budget
shortfall came as a surprise. Although we view this possibility as remote, it would not affect our analysis on volumes of
transactions as made clear below. It would nonetheless affect the interpretation of our price findings. They would need
to be thought as the effect of a land transfer tax relative to another form of taxation instead of a pure LTT effect.
4 The property tax rate increased from .0085 to .0087 form 2007 to 2008, an increase of 2.5%. The corresponding rates
for Brampton, Markham, Mississauga, Pickering, Richmond Hill and Vaughan were; 3.4%, 2.9% 3.2% 4.6% 3.1% 2.9%.
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1.3%, New York’s is between 1.4 and 1.9%, and Philadelphia’s is 3%. Given these high rates, it is
not surprising that for some cities and states, property transfer taxes account for a non trivial share
of revenue; 2.9% of total revenue for the State of New Hampshire, 3.4% for the State of Florida,
3.8% for the District of Columbia, 4.8% for New York, 6.2% for Chicago, 11.0% for Philadelphia,
and 22.2% for Oakland (CA).
In Canada, the provincial governments of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and some Nova Scotia municipalities impose a land transfer tax.
Australian states levy a similar tax with rates up to 6.75 percent. In the UK, the LTT, there called
a ’stamp duty tax,’ ranges from 1 to 4 percent, and in 2007, accounted for Bn £6.5, or about 1.25%
of the budget of the British government. Countries in Southern Europe also rely on land transfer
taxes. In France the rate for residential property was above 10 percent during the 1980s, but was
reduced to 4.8 percent in 1999. Revenue from the property transfer tax represented about 3% of
the budget of the French government in 2008.
In sum, land transfer taxes are economically important. They are pervasive and provide an
important source of revenue for local and national governments.

3. Literature
A. Other analyses of land transfer taxes
Given the economic importance of land transfer taxes, there is surprisingly little systematic analysis of their effects. In a first study, Benjamin, Coulson, and Yang (1993) examine the effects of an
increase in the Philadelphia Real Estate Transfer Tax. On the basis of around 350 transactions, they
find that properties located inside Philadelphia decrease in price relative to properties outside and
that this decrease is much larger than the tax increase. Unfortunately, their data do not allow them
to examine volumes of transactions.
Ioannides and Kan (1996) propose a model of residential mobility and housing tenure choice in
which purchasing a house is subject to a proportional transaction cost. Empirically, after conditioning out much individual heterogeneity, they find no association between property values and the
propensity to move either to rental or owner occupied housing. In the context of their model, they
interpret this finding as an indication that proportional transactions costs do not affect mobility.
Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn (2005) use the same theoretical framework and more detailed
data about transaction costs in the Netherlands. Although transaction costs do not vary over time
and over space in their data, they use again differences between renters and homeowners. They
find that an LTT-equivalent tax with the same rate as implemented in Toronto would decrease
mobility by 8 to 19 percent. Finally, Nowlan (2007) provides an ex-ante evaluation of the Toronto
LTT .

He argues, from theoretical foundations and hypothetical estimates of the demand and supply

for housing, that the LTT would have only a minimal impact on the Toronto real estate market.
In contrast with these studies, our estimation is based on a sample that records the large
majority of single-family home transactions in the greater Toronto area for 25 months before the
imposition of the LTT and for the first seven months afterward. We exploit detailed information
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about the timing of transactions and their location to identify the effect of this tax. Thus, we can
reasonably hope to arrive at definitive estimates of the LTT’s effects.
B. Other border studies
The RD design is increasingly popular and is used to investigate, for example, the effect of class
sizes on educational attainment (Angrist and Lavy, 1999), the effect of changes in social assistance
programs on employment (Lemieux and Milligan, 2008), or the effect of mayoral party affiliation
on municipal policies (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009). The essential identifying assumption is that,
absent the change in policy, the dependent variable would change continuously at the cut-off
(Hahn et al., 2001). Best practice is described in Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
The method has also been used to investigate the effect of policies which vary over physical
space as one crosses from one administrative unit to another. In this case, the cut-off of interest
is an administrative boundary. Holmes (1998) looks at the impact of changes in right-to-work
laws on manufacturing employment near state borders. Black (1999), Gibbons and Machin (2003),
and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) look at the effect of changes in property values near
school district boundaries. Duranton, Gobillon, and Overman (2011) look at the effect of changes in
municipal taxation across municipal boundaries on the behaviour of firms near these boundaries.
While our identification strategy is clearly related to those used in the papers listed above, it
differs in important respects. Because Toronto imposed a land transfer tax and none of the surrounding municipalities did, our data allow us to isolate the effects of a change in a dichotomous
variable at a single border; the effect of imposing a land transfer tax on houses in Toronto along
the Toronto-Suburban border. On the other hand, in Black (1999), Gibbons and Machin (2003), and
Bayer et al. (2007) the policy variable of interest is continuous, ‘school district quality’, for Holmes
(1998), it is an index measuring the extent to which a state is ‘pro-business’, and for Duranton
et al. (2011) it is local tax rates. Loosely, these authors identify the effect of their chosen policy in a
two-step process. In the first, they estimate the discontinuity of interest at many borders, and in the
second they examine the correlation between the magnitude of these cross-border discontinuities
and the corresponding cross-border change in the policy variable of interest. Thus, most extant
border studies uses variation across administrative borders in a way that is less similar than it may
appear at first sight. Because our policy variable is dichotomous and we consider only a single
border, we are much closer to the idealised description of the RD design described by Hahn et al.
(2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) or used to the study of the effects of social assistance by
Lemieux and Milligan (2008).

4. Data
Our estimations are based on data that describe the sale of 139,266 single-family houses in the
greater Toronto area that were listed with the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) between January 2006
and August 2008. In particular, our study area includes Toronto and all nearby municipalities:
Mississauga, Brampton, Vaughn, Richmond Hill, Markham, and Pickering. A map of the study
area is provided in figure 3. For each transaction we observe the sale price, the date when the
8

Figure 3. Study area

Our study area is the City of Toronto and the immediately surrounding municipalities of Mississauga,
Brampton, Vaughn, Richmond Hill, Markham and Pickering. Lake Ontario is to the South of Mississauga,
Toronto, and Pickering.

contract was signed, the date the transaction closed, and the property’s postal code. We also observe about 40 house characteristics for each sale. Specifically, we have binary variables describing:
heating; garage; basement; whether the house is attached; number of stories; construction type; the
presence of a family room; and fireplace, along with counts of: bedrooms; bathrooms; kitchens;
rooms; parking spaces; square feet and lot size. We exclude condominiums from our analysis.5
To determine whether a sale is subject to the LTT, we first verify whether the property is in
Toronto or not. We use GIS software to assign to each property the latitude and longitude of the
centroid of the property’s postal code. We then use these coordinates to check whether the property
lies within Toronto municipal boundaries, and also to calculate the distance to the Toronto border.
Figure 4 presents a map of a portion of the Toronto border along with outlines of census tracts and
postal codes. In this figure, the Toronto border is a wide light gray line. Census tract boundaries
are medium-width lines in medium gray. Postal code boundaries are thin black lines. Postal code
centroids are black points. In Toronto, postal codes are small, typically one block along one side of
a street. As can be seen from the scale bar in figure 4’s upper left hand corner, postal code centroids
are generally within a few hundred metres of a property, and often much closer. Thus, we can be
confident that we are calculating properties’ locations accurately.
5 Condominiums are more likely to be purchased by first time buyers exempt from much of the LTT . Moreover,
new condominiums are often sold directly by developers who bypass MLS system. Therefore, not only does our data
describe the condominium market less well than the market for single family homes, but the market for single-family
homes and the market for condominiums appear to be separate: pooling data on single family home sales with data on
condominium sales is not appropriate.
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Figure 4. . A map showing an area along Toronto’s northern border.
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The Toronto border is a wide light gray line. Census Tract boundaries are medium width lines in medium
gray. Postal Code boundaries are thin black lines. Postal code centroids are black points. Source: University
of Toronto GIS Library.

5. Econometric model
Our econometric model is a hybrid of a regression discontinuity design and a differences-indifferences estimation. Like differences-in-differences, we compare the change in transaction
volume for tracts in Toronto that are ‘treated’ with the LTT to untreated suburban tracts. As in
a regression discontinuity design, we calculate our differences as close to the treatment threshold,
the Toronto border, as is possible. Because our approach resembles a differences-in-differences
estimate, we are concerned about the possibility of differential trends in transaction volume among
treated and untreated tracts. For example, if sales rise faster in Toronto than in the suburbs, we
will confound this differential trend with the effect of the LTT. Because our approach resembles a
regression discontinuity design, we are concerned about the possibility of a gradient in transaction
volumes. For example, if the rate of transactions rises as we cross from Toronto into the suburbs,
this slope may confound our estimates of the change in transactions volumes caused by the LTT.
As made clear below by our estimating equations, our approach boils down to a differences-indifferences estimation for observations on a narrow band on both sides of the Toronto border. In
the rest of this section, we further develop the econometrics that underlies our approach.
To proceed, let t denote time, with t < 0 being before the imposition of the LTT, and t > 0 being
after. Let x denote distance from the border, with x > 0 being Toronto, and x < 0 being suburban.
Define indicator variables based on x and t,
(
χ LTT =

if

0 else
(

χ TO =

1
1

if

0 else.
10

t≥0
x≥0

That is, χ TO is one in Toronto and zero in the suburbs, while χ LTT is one after the imposition of
the LTT, and zero before. If both indicators are one then we restrict attention to Toronto after the
imposition of the LTT.
Let v( x,t) denote the volume of real estate transactions at a particular location and time. We
can decompose this function into five pieces: g( x,t) a continuous latent volume surface describing
transactions in the absence of the LTT or other cross-border policy differences; α LTT χ LTT a jump in
the volume surface that occurs at the time of the LTT, e.g., a market downturn or bad weather;
α TO χ TO a jump in the volume surface that occurs at the Toronto border; λχ TO χ LTT , the effect of the
LTT

that is the quantity of interest; and finally, e( x,t), a mean zero error term whose properties

we discuss below. To ease exposition, suppose that g is a second order polynomial, g( x,t) =
g0 + gx x + gt t + gxx x2 + gtt t2 + gxt xt.
We now adjust this notation so that it describes our data rather than an abstract surface. To accomplish this, let i index our unit of observation, usually an individual postal code, but sometimes
a distribution area or census tract. Let t index months. By analogy to the notation developed above,
let vit denote the count of sales in unit i and month t and let xit denote the mean distance from a
house in unit i to the Toronto border.6 Let zit denote a vector describing the mean characteristics of
houses sold in unit i in month t. It is also useful to define δi as an indicator variable for each postal
code i. Finally, we let eit denote the mean zero component of volume determined by unobserved
factors, and χitTO and χitLTT be indicator variables corresponding to χ TO and χ LTT .
Ideally, we would draw our sample from a region of space and time close enough to ( x,t) =

(0,0) that we could ignore all terms of g( x,t) except the constant. To obtain a usefully large sample,
however, we must sample from a region of space and time large enough that variation of the latent
volume surface cannot not be ignored. In this case we have,
vit = [ g0 + gx x + gt t + gxx x2 + gtt t2 + gxt xt] + αz zit + α TO χitTO + α LTT χitLTT + λχitTO χitLTT + eit .

(1)

Inspection of equation (1) makes clear that our method of identifying the effects of the LTT
requires that no other contemporaneous change in policy differentially affects transaction volumes
in Toronto and the surrounding municipalities. If, for example, Toronto raised property taxes at
the same time as it imposed the LTT and the suburbs did not, then our estimate of λ would reflect
the total effect of the property tax change and the LTT. As noted in section 2A, we do not appear to
face this problem in our data.
Recalling that χitTO is a function of x and χitLTT a function of t, inspection of equation (1) makes
clear the importance of controlling for spatial and temporal variation in the latent volume surface.
If we estimate equation (1) without adequate controls for gx x + gxx x2 , then these terms are part
of the residual and χ TO is obviously endogenous. Similarly, if we estimate equation (1) without
adequate controls for gt t + gtt t2 , then these terms are part of the residual and χ TO is endogenous.
Equation (2) addresses these problems using postal code fixed effects, δi , and monthly time
fixed effects, χt , to control non-parametrically for g0 + gx x + gxx x2 and gt t + gtt t2 . Since postal
6 Note that x need not be constant over time. We calculate distance by assigning transactions to individual postal
it
codes. Thus, for a (larger) census tract, the mean distance from a transaction to the border may vary if the distribution
of transactions across individual postal codes in the census tract is not stationary.
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codes are entirely included in a municipality, a Toronto effect, α TO , and postal code fixed effects
cannot be separately identified. Similarly, a post LTT effect, α LTT , and monthly indicators cannot be
separately identified. Including postal code and monthly indicators and normalising both α TO and
α LTT to zero in equation (1) leaves us with,
vit = δi + ∑ αt χt + αz zit + λχitTO χitLTT + µit .

(2)

t

Equation (2), and a variant which excludes house characteristics, will be our main estimating
equations. We here note three potential problems with this baseline specification.
First, comparing equations (1) and (2), we see that the error in equation (2) is µit = gxt xit tit +
eit . µ. Since gxt xit tit is part of the error term, χ TO and χ LTT are endogenous unless gxt = 0. In
words, after controlling non-parametrically for all purely temporal and purely spatial variation in
g, equation (2) requires that there not be different trends in the growth of transaction volume in
Toronto and the suburbs. We postpone a discussion of our approach to this problem.
Second, equation (1) implicitly requires that the parameters, α TO , α LTT and λ, be invariant in x
and t. This is probably not true. In particular, figure 1 suggests a run-up in sales volume during the
fall of 2007 as buyers and sellers raced to complete their transactions ahead of the imposition date
for the LTT.7 If so, then the effect of the LTT varies over time. To prevent this adjustment period
from driving our estimate of λ, define the indicator variables
(
1
if
x ≥ 0 and t = τ for τ ∈ T = {−3, − 2, − 1,1,2,3}
χτ =
0 else,

(3)

In words, the χτ are six monthly dummy variables for Toronto for the months immediately before
and after the imposition of the LTT. If we include these variables in equation (1) then we no longer
use these six months to identify the effect of the LTT.
Third, we are concerned that the effect of the LTT is larger farther from the border, in downtown
Toronto, where prices are higher. To allow for this possibility define the indicator variable,
(
1
if
x ≥ k and t > 0
χ x >k =
0 else.
That is, χ x>k is one when the LTT is in effect and the area in question is in Toronto at least distance
k from the municipal border. By including χ x>k in our estimating equations we are able to test
whether the effect of the LTT is larger for Toronto parcels further from the border.
Adding these new indicator variables to equation (2) we have,
vit = δi + ∑ αt χt + αz zit + λχitTO χitLTT +
t

∑ ατ χitτ + αx>k χx>k + µit .

(4)

τ ∈T

Finally, we note the possibility that different segments of the property market may react differently to the LTT. To investigate this possibility, we experiment with separate regressions for
different price classes of houses.
7 We

note that this spike in transactions just visible in bottom panel of figure 2 in the increasing rate of divergence
between Toronto and suburban transaction volumes in the months immediately prior to the imposition of the LTT.
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Table 2. Effect of the LTT on the number of transactions: characteristics, time trends, and types of houses

Variable
LTT

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

-0.15

-0.15

-0.13

-0.13

-0.33

-0.15

-0.28

-0.09

(0.04)a

(0.04)a

(0.04)a

(0.04)a

(0.07)a

(0.05)a

(0.07)a

(0.06)

House charact.
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Indicators TO +/-3 m. N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Time trends TO
N
N
N
N
One Two
N
N
Houses
All
All
All
All
All
All <k$ 400 >k$ 400
Observations
226995 226990 226995 226990 226995 226995 107645 130642
% Effect of LTT

-16

-16

-14

-14

-39

-16

-32

-9

All regressions are Poisson regressions estimated for postal codes within three kilometres of the Toronto
border. They all include fixed effects for each month and postal code fixed effects. House charact. is a vector
of house characteristics as discussed above. Indicators TO +/- 3 m are six dummy variables for Toronto
postal codes during the last three months of 2007 and the first three of 2008. Time trends TO indicates
the presence of one or two time trends for Toronto postal codes. Standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c:
corresponding coefficient significant at 1, 5, 10%.

6. Results for transaction volumes
Table 2 reports estimation results for transaction volumes. Because of the discrete nature of our
data and the large number of zeroes, Poisson regressions are more appropriate than OLS. Thus,
all the regressions in table 2 are Poisson regressions. We experiment with alternative estimation
methods below. For all regressions in table 2 the dependent variable is the number of sales within
three kilometres of the Toronto border in each postal code in each month between January 2006
and August 2008. We experiment below with alternative geographic units. All regressions contain
postal code and month indicators.
Column 1 presents our baseline specification using only month indicators and postal code fixed
effects as controls. That is, we estimate the following simplified version of equation (2),
vit = δi + ∑ αt χt + λχitTO χitLTT + µit ,
t

which does not include house characteristics zit . The explanatory variable of interest is the LTT
indicator variable, χitTO χitLTT , which takes the value one for transactions subject to the LTT and zero
otherwise. In column 1, the coefficient of the LTT indicator is negative and significantly different
from zero at the 1 percent level.
While the Poisson estimator is well suited to predicting our count data, the resulting coefficients
are difficult to interpret. To assess the magnitude of our estimated effect, for all postal code months
subject to the LTT we calculate the predicted number of sales when the LTT is in effect and the
predicted number of sales in the counterfactual case when the LTT is not in effect. Our estimate of
the effect of the LTT is the mean, over all postal code months, of the percentage difference between
these two quantities. This estimate of the effect of the LTT is given in the last row of the table. The
coefficient of -0.15 in the second row of column 1 corresponds to a decline in transaction volume
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in Toronto of 16%.8 This is a large effect. The principal pecuniary costs associated with buying a
property are brokers’ fees, the pre-existing provincial LTT, and the physical cost of moving. If we
take these transaction costs to represent between 6 and 7% of the purchase price, the average LTT
of 1.1% paid by Toronto buyers corresponds to an increase of about 15% in mobility costs. Hence,
the estimate in column 1 suggests that a 1% increase in transactions costs leads to a decline in
transactions volume of approximately 1%.
In column 2, we add house characteristics, zit , to the specification of column 1, but do not report
their coefficients. Only a minority of house characteristics are significantly correlated with the
propensity to sell. For instance, the association between selling and more bathrooms is positive
whereas the association between selling and more kitchens is negative. The coefficient of the LTT
indicator remains the same as in column 1. Because we worry that house characteristics might be
determined simultaneously with the decision to sell, we do not systematically include this set of
controls in our regressions.
Column 3 is our preferred specification. In column 3, we include 6 monthly indicator variables
for Toronto postal codes from October 2007 to March 2008, the term ∑τ ∈T ατ χitτ in equation (4).
Including these controls changes our estimate of the LTT effect from -16 to -14%. In the run-up to
the LTT in November and December 2007, Toronto postal codes experience about a 20% increase
in transactions volume.9 Including the six additional monthly indicator variables conditions out
this run-up in volume, and also the small decrease that occurred in early 2008. Given that these
monthly indicators affect our results (albeit slightly), we retain them from now on. In column 4, we
add house characteristics to the specification in column 3. The LTT coefficient remains unchanged.
We now turn our attention to the possibility of spatially differentiated trends. In column 5, we
begin in the simplest way by adding a linear time trend for Toronto postal codes. This trend covers
our entire study period except for October 2007 to March 2008. The coefficient for the trend variable
is large, corresponding to an increase in sales of around 1% per month in Toronto postal codes
relative to suburban postal codes. The upward trend in Toronto volumes mechanically implies
that the magnitude of the LTT coefficient increases. In fact, including the trend variable changes
our estimated LTT effect to -39%. Thus, the results from column 5 suggest that different trends in
transactions volume on the Toronto and suburban sides of the border are an important feature of
the data and that the Toronto specific trend has confounded our previous estimations.
In column 6, we test the robustness of column 5’s result by allowing for a piecewise linear trend
for Toronto. That is, we consider a first trend for Toronto from January 2006 to September 2007 and
a second trend, also for Toronto, from April to August 2008. The coefficient on the LTT is now much
8 Running the same regression without postal code fixed effects estimates a smaller LTT effect of around -6%. This
is unsurprising because this regression fails to account for the fact that postal codes in Toronto experience a greater
number of sales, possibly because they are more intensely developed. We do not report these fixed effects for obvious
reasons. We do not report months effects either. It is enough to say that they exhibit strong seasonality.
9 The coefficient for October 2007 is actually negative but insignificant. This is consistent with the notion that the LTT
was not anticipated before it was voted at the end of the month. The coefficient for January 2008 is positive and again
insignificant. The positive sign for January probably reflects the subtleties of the implementation of the LTT with a rush
to sell at the beginning of the month so that the closing date would be before the LTT. This rush slightly dominates the
slowdown later in the month. The effects for February and March 2008 are negative, but small and not significant. We
experimented with the dates. Considering earlier or later months does not affect our estimate of the LTT.
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Figure 5. Time path of post code, month and characteristic corrected transactions across the Toronto border.

The solid (dashed) line shows the average corrected volume of transactions from January 2006 until August
2008 for a five kilometre wide band just outside (inside) the Toronto border.

closer to our preferred estimate in column 3, with an effect of -16%. Thus, contrary to column 5,
column 6 suggests that spatially differentiated trends are not affecting our estimates.
Figure 5 resolves the apparent contradiction. This figure describes monthly transaction volumes
in five kilometre bands just inside and just outside the Toronto border during the period around
the implementation of the LTT, January 2006 to August 2008 on which our estimations. This is the
period and geographic region on which most of our estimations are based. However, rather than
report mean transaction volumes, figure 5 reports mean postal code transaction volumes, after
these transactions volumes have been corrected for postal code, month and house characteristics.
That is, it reports the mean residuals, by month and area, from a regression like one in column 2 of
table 2, but excluding the LTT indicator.
Figure 5 shows the presence of spatially differentiated trends in corrected transactions volume.
In particular, if we disregard the three months on either side of the implementation date, we
see that Toronto volumes are diverging from suburban volumes prior to the LTT and converging
afterwards. This suggests that the simple linear trend implemented in column 5 of table 3 is not
appropriate and should be ignored in favour of the more complicated specification of column 6.
In sum, columns 5 and 6 together with figure 5 indicate the importance of spatially differentiated
trends in our data, but also indicate that they do not have much effect on our estimate of λ once
we correctly control for them in column 6.
In columns 7 and 8, we allow for the possibility that the LTT may affect different market
segments differently. Given the simultaneous determination of property prices and the LTT rate, a
complete examination of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as a beginning,
in column 7 we estimate the effect of the LTT for houses with a price below $ 400,000. In column 8,
we conduct a similar exercise for houses with a price above $ 400,000. We find that the LTT has a
much larger effect on cheaper houses (-32%) than on more expensive houses (-9%, insignificant).10
Table 3 reports further results for transaction volumes with a focus on geography and estimation
techniques. In column 1, we extend our sample of observations to consider all houses in postal
codes within five kilometres of the Toronto border instead of 3. Except for this difference, this
10 We

also experimented with splitting our sample along a number of dimensions related to house characteristics but
did not find anything conclusive.

15

Table 3. Effect of the LTT on the number of transactions: distances and estimation techniques

Variable
LTT

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson

OLS

[7]

[8]
Neg. Bin.

-0.18

-0.12

-0.16

-0.18

-0.07

-0.11

-0.01

-0.13

(0.03)a

(0.05)b

(0.04)a

(0.05)a

(0.04)c

(0.04)a

(0.003)a

(0.04)a

3km
N

3km
N

3km
N

3km
N

Distance threshold
5km
2km
5km
5km
Distance LTT trends
N
N
Step
Y
Geographical unit Postal code Postal code Postal code Postal code
Observations
385188 146338 385188 385188
% Effect of LTT

[6]
Poisson

-19

-13

-18

-20

Census tract Distribution Area Postal code Postal code

6705

36965

297174

226995

-8

-12

-20

-13

All regressions include a month indicators, month indicators for Toronto between October 2007 and
March 2008, and fixed effects for the appropriate geographic unit. Standard errors in parentheses. a, b, c:
corresponding coefficient significant at 1, 5, 10%.

specification mirrors that of column 3 in table 2. The estimated effect is slightly larger at -19%
instead of -14%. These two coefficients are nonetheless statistically indistinguishable. In column
2, we replicate again the same regression but consider only a two kilometre band on both sides of
the Toronto border. The results are very similar to those obtained with a three kilometre band with
an LTT effect of -13%.
In column 3, we return to a five kilometre band but add a coefficient for Toronto postal codes located between two and a half and five kilometres away from the Toronto border. This corresponds
to the term α x>k χ x>k for k = 2.5 in equation (4). The (unreported) coefficient for the additional
effect of the LTT beyond two and a half kilometres is negative but insignificant. Rather than a two
step effect, in column 4 we estimate a spatial trend by interacting the implementation of the LTT
with distance to the border. The (unreported) coefficient for this spatial trend is again insignificant.
Overall, the results of column 1-4 are suggestive of a slightly stronger effect of the LTT as one moves
away from the border towards the centre of Toronto but this effect is not statistically significant.11
In column 5, we repeat our preferred regression but use census tracts as our unit of observation
instead of postal codes. Census tracts are bigger than postal codes by a factor of more than 30.
The effect of the LTT is smaller than with postal codes, -8% instead of -14%. In column 6, we use
distribution areas which are smaller than census tracts but still much larger than postal codes. The
estimated effect of the LTT on the volume of transaction is -12%. Using coarse geographical units
neglects important small scale variation.
In column 7, we repeat our preferred estimation but this time use OLS with standard errors
clustered by postal codes rather than a Poisson regression. We see that, at -20%, the OLS estimate
of the LTT effect is close to our preferred estimate.12 In column 8, we repeat the same exercise
11 We experimented with various specifications but we were unable to evidence any robust pattern in the spatial effects

of the LTT either within or outside Toronto.
12 We also used this specification to explore whether accounting for the spatial autocorrelation of errors affected our
standard errors. The effects are small. For instance, running the same OLS specification but clustering the error term
at the level of three-digit postal codes increases the standard error on the LTT coefficient by about 10%. It remains
significant at 1%.

16

Table 4. Effect of the LTT on the number of transactions: results by quarters

Variable
LTT

[1]

[2]

[3]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

-0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13
(0.04)a

(0.04)a

(0.04)a

House charact.
N
Y
Y
First quarter
06Q1 06Q1 06Q1
Last quarter
08Q3 08Q3 08Q3
07Q4 and 08Q1 excluded
N
N
N
Indicators 07Q4 and 08Q1 for TO N
N
Y
Time trends TO
N
N
N
Time units
Q
Q
Q
Observations
78813 78811 78811
% Effect of LTT

[4]

-14

-14

-12

(0.05)b

(0.04)b

Y
06Q1
08Q3
N
Y
Two
Q
78813

Y
Y
Y
Y
06Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q3
08Q3 08Q3 08Q3 08Q2
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
B&A Q
Q B&A
15078 6286 6286 2961

-14

-9

(0.04)a (0.05)a (0.06)b

-17

-14

-14

All regressions are Poisson regressions estimated for postal codes within three kilometres of the Toronto
border. They all include postal code fixed effects. House charact. is a vector of house characteristics as
discussed above. First quarter and Last quarter indicate the time span considered. 07Q4 and 08Q1 excluded
indicates the deletion of the last quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. Indicators 07Q4 and 08Q1 for
TO are two dummy variables for Toronto postal codes during the last quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of
2008. Time trends TO indicates the presence of time trends for Toronto postal codes. Finally the time units
are Q for quarters and B & A when only two periods are considered, before and after the LTT. Standard
errors in parentheses. a, b, c: corresponding coefficient significant at 1, 5, 10%.

using a negative binomial rather than a Poisson regression. This yields the same estimate of the
LTT

coefficient as the corresponding Poisson regression.

Following the argument made by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), serially correlated
transactions at the postal code level could bias downwards the standard errors for the LTT coefficient in tables 2 and 3. To explore this issue, table 4 reports a series of results using transactions
data aggregated over longer periods of time, quarters or more instead of months. Although coarser
time controls may have a small effect on the point estimates, they will reduce any problem caused
by serial correlation.
Column 1 of table 4 reproduces the specification of column 1 of table 2 but uses a quarterly
aggregation instead of a monthly aggregation. While the point estimates differ only a little (-0.146
vs. -0.131), the standard errors are virtually identical (0.0358 vs. 0.0356). Column 2 adds house
characteristics to the regression and thus mirrors column 2 of table 2 with quarterly data. The
results are the same: a slightly lower point estimate and identical standard errors. Column 3 adds
indicator variables for Toronto during the last quarter of 2007 (to condition out the pre-LTT spike
of transactions) and first quarter of 2008 (to condition out the post-LTT reflection of the previous
spike). This corresponds to column 4 of table 2 with quarterly data and leads to yet again the same
result. Column 4 enriches the specification further by adding two time trends, before and after the
LTT .

This mirrors column 6 of table 2. Similar standard errors are again indicative of a lack of serial

correlation.
In column 5 of table 4, time aggregation is taken to the extreme and we consider only two
time periods, before and after the LTT. Because it includes house characteristics, this specification
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mirrors column 2 with two time periods. The standard errors remain identical. In column 6, we
return to the specification of column 2 but ignore 2006 to consider only transactions from 2007 and
2008. This alternative strategy also reduces the number of quarters before the implementation of
the LTT and should allow us to reduce any problem caused by serial correlation. Relative to column
2, the standard errors increase by less than 10% while the number of observation is about halved.
Column 7 duplicates the same regression again but excludes observations from the last quarter
of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. Despite another reduction in the number of observations,
standard errors increase only slightly. In column 8, we estimate an even more extreme specification
that only considers transactions from the third quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2008. The
point estimates are still the same and the loss of precision remains small. Despite using less than
3,000 observation instead of close to 227,000 in column 2 of table 2, the standard error for the LTT
coefficient in column 8 of table 4 is less than double.
From tables 2 and 4, we conclude that the effect of the LTT on transaction volumes is between
-10 and -20%, with our preferred estimate being -14%. This conclusion is robust to our choice of
geography, controls for house characteristics, time aggregation, and choice of estimation method.
Controlling for the peak of transactions in Toronto prior to the implementation of the LTT makes a
small difference to our estimates. Controlling correctly for spatially differentiated trends does not
affect our results. Trying to minimise the effect of serial correlation in transactions causes virtually
no change to the standard errors. Finally, one might worry that this decline in transactions is only
temporary and caused by the reluctance of sellers to incur a nominal loss after the implementation
of the LTT (Genesove and Mayer, 2009). This concern is misplaced because prices were still increasing during the first half of 2008 according to the Terranet National Bank House Price Index.13
Besides, as we show next, the price reduction caused by the LTT is small and thus unlikely to have
such effects.

7. Results for prices
For our sample, the average amount of LTT paid is about 1.1 percent of the sale price. Consistent
with this, inspection of figure 2 suggests that the effect of the LTT on prices is small. In this section,
we refine the estimate of the price effect of the LTT suggested by figure 2, with the caveat that
measuring so small an effect accurately is difficult, even with our high-quality data.
Our strategy for estimating the effect of the LTT on the price of single-family homes is much
the same as the one we employ to estimate the effect of the LTT on the number of sales. For sales
within a three kilometre band around the Toronto border between January 2006 and August 2008
we estimate,
LTT
log p jt = δi( j) + ∑ αt χt + αz z jt + λχ TO
jt χ jt +

t

∑ ατ χτjt + µ jt .

(5)

τ ∈T

Although this equation resembles our estimating equation (4) for transaction volumes, several
differences are worth highlighting. First, we use the log of the sale price for individual transactions
as the dependent variable. The unit of observation is a particular transaction, j, sold in a given
13 See

http://www.housepriceindex.ca/Default.aspx.
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Table 5. Effect of the LTT on prices

Variable
LTT

(% change)

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

-1.31

-0.76

-0.88

-1.43

-0.81

-1.19

-1.48

-0.81

(0.62)b

(0.42)c

(0.49)c

(0.79)c

(0.42)c

(0.47)b

(0.60)b

(0.64)

House characteristics
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Indicators TO +/-3 m.
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Time trends TO
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Distance threshold
3km 3km 3km 3km 5km 5km 5km 2km
Distance LTT trends
N
N
N
N
N
Step
Y
N
Observations
19785 19783 19783 19783 32994 32994 32994 12773
All regressions are OLS regressions estimated with postal codes fixed effects and indicator variables for
each month from January 2006 to August 2008. House characteristics is a vector of house characteristics as
discussed above. Indicators TO +/- 3 m are six dummy variables for Toronto postal codes during the last
three months of 2007 and the first three of 2008. Time trends TO indicates the presence of one or two time
trends for Toronto postal codes. Distance threshold is the maximum distance to the Toronto border for a
postal code to be included. Distance LTT trend denotes the inclusion of an interaction term between LTT
and distance to the Toronto border for Toronto postal codes. Standard errors clustered by postal code in
parentheses. a, b, c: corresponding coefficient significant at 1, 5, 10%.

month, t. Since the dependent variable, log transaction price, is continuous, we estimate equation
(5) with OLS (rather than with Poisson, as we used for equation 4). Price is a function of its location
captured by its postal code, δi( j) .14 As in our earlier volume regressions, equation (4), we include
monthly fixed effects, ∑t αt χt , in equation (5). House characteristics, αz z jt are also included and
play a more important role. We expect the Toronto market during the months immediately before
and after the implementation of the LTT to experience some turmoil which might affect prices.
Therefore, we control for month effects in Toronto from October 2007 to March 2008, as we do in
equation (4), with the term ∑τ ∈T ατ χτjt . Finally, as in equation (4), the effect of the LTT is captured
LTT
by the term in λχ TO
jt χ jt .

Column 1 presents our baseline specification using only month indicators and postal code fixed
effects as controls. This estimation mirrors the first regression of table 2 and estimates the following
LTT
simplified version of equation (5): log p jt = δi( j) + ∑t αt χt + λχ TO
jt χ jt + µ jt . In this regression the

coefficient of the LTT indicator is negative and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
level. As expected the effect of the LTT on property prices is modest at -1.3%. This effect is slightly
above the average LTT rate but statistically indistinguishable from it.
In column 2, we add house characteristics, the term in αz zit in equation (5), to mirror the
second column of table 2. We use the same broad set of property characteristics as previously.
The coefficient of the LTT indicator is now slightly smaller at -0.8%. However it does not differ
statistically from the tax rate nor from the estimate in column 1. We do not report here the
coefficients for house characteristics. Most of them are highly significant and their signs and
magnitudes are unsurprising. Because of their importance in explaining houses prices we retain
house characteristics in subsequent price regressions.
14 Because

we cannot track properties over time (only their postal code), we cannot use a repeated-sale index methodology (Case and Shiller, 1987).
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In column 3, as in column 3 of table 2, we add 6 monthly indicators variables for October 2007
to March 2008. These correspond to the term in ∑τ ∈T ατ χitτ in equation (5) and lead to a marginally
larger effect of the LTT at -0.9%. Interestingly, we find a small significant jump in prices of around

3% for Toronto in December 2007.15 This suggests that the heating up of the market in the run-up
to the LTT led some buyers to pay more than the amount of the LTT in their rush to avoid it.
This regression is our preferred estimation. Although, they do not make any difference to our
results, we retain these six monthly indicators to maintain symmetry with our transactions volume
regressions.
In column 4, we add a time trend for all Toronto transactions. For reasons similar to those
in our previous set of regressions, adding a time trend increases the LTT coefficient, albeit not
as dramatically as for transaction volumes. We experimented with time effects more extensively
and, as with our volumes regressions, we conclude that our results are somewhat sensitive to the
inclusion of time trends and the exact specification for them.
In column 5, we replicate our preferred regression of column 3 but we extend our sample of
observations to consider all properties sold within five kilometres of the Toronto border instead
of 3. This specification mirrors the first column of table 3 for transaction volumes. At -0.8% our
estimated coefficient is slightly smaller but statistically indistinguishable from our preferred estimate of -0.9%. In column 6, we explore the possibility of a spatially differentiated effect of the LTT by
adding a coefficient for Toronto properties between two and a half and five kilometres away from
the Toronto border. This (unreported) coefficient is positive but small and insignificant. In column
7, we consider instead a spatial trend by interacting the implementation of the LTT with distance
to the border. The (unreported) coefficient for this spatial trend is again tiny and insignificant.
Finally, in column 8, we replicate our preferred specification of column 3 but restrict our sample to
all properties sold within two kilometres of the Toronto border instead of 3. The coefficient is very
close to that in our preferred specification (and that using a five kilometre threshold in column
5). With fewer transactions, the standard errors are now slightly larger, making the coefficient
statistically insignificant.
In all of our price regressions we examine the effect on price of a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the transaction was subject to the LTT. We also experiment with other measures
of the LTT, in particular with an interaction between the LTT indicator and the tax rate to which
the transaction is was subject. This experiment did not lead to statistically significant estimates of
the effect of the LTT on price. Partitioning our sample into more and less expensive houses and
repeating our estimations on the resulting sub-samples provides weak evidence for the hypothesis
the price effect is stronger for properties that pay a higher rate.
Overall, the results of our price regressions suggest that the LTT led to a decrease in Toronto
property prices of about the same magnitude as the tax.
15 The

coefficients for the other months are not significant.
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8. A simple model of residential location with property taxes
We now consider a simple model of residential location. Our goals are to understand the implications of the LTT for location decisions, to understand the welfare implications the LTT, and to
provide the foundations for our welfare calculation.
Consider an economy with two possible locations and two agents. The locations are ‘Toronto’,
denoted T, and a ‘suburb’, denoted S.16 The two agents are an incumbent, I, who owns a house
in Toronto but who may move to the suburb, and an entrant, E, who will move to Toronto or the
suburb. Since there are only two possible locations, one of the two agents must locate in Toronto,
and the other in the suburb. Let j ∈ { E,I } index players.

Initially both entrant and incumbent draw an employment or educational opportunity in

Toronto. This opportunity has monetary value u Tj if agent j locates in Toronto, and zero otherwise.

We suppose that each player draws u Tj from a uniform distribution with support [u,u], and that
these draws are common knowledge.

Next, the incumbent chooses the price p T at which he offers to sell his house to the entrant. The
entrant then chooses a location lE ∈ {S,T }. If the entrant rejects the incumbent’s offer, he chooses

lE = S and moves to the suburbs, while the incumbent remains in Toronto. If the entrant accepts,

he chooses lE = T, he pays p T to the incumbent and occupies the incumbent’s house, while the
incumbent moves to the suburbs.
All suburban housing provides both entrant and incumbent with the same monetary payoff,
uS

< u, and can be purchased for price pS . To ease exposition suppose that the incumbent does
not pay for housing if he remains in Toronto. Each agent acts to maximise the difference between
the value associated with his location, and the price paid for that location.
Suppose that the market price at each location is such that the seller captures all of the surplus,
as in ‘take it or leave it’ bargaining, and that the entrant moves to Toronto when he is indifferent
between locations. Since the seller captures all surplus, we must have uS = pS . That is, whether the
entrant or incumbent ends up in the suburbs, the price of the suburban house is equal to the value
of occupying it. Our assumption that the incumbent capture all surplus requires that the entrant
be indifferent between the suburbs and Toronto whenever he moves to Toronto. Therefore, if the
incumbent sells to the entrant then the sale price must satisfy u TE − p T = uS − pS . This requires
that p T = u TE .
The incumbent will sell to the entrant if and only if his payoff from doing so exceeds his payoff
from staying in Toronto. That is, if and only if p T + uS − pS > u TI . It follows that the incumbent
moves to the suburbs (and the entrant to Toronto) if and only if u TE > u TI and that if this transaction
occurs then p T = u TE .
We now suppose that a land transfer tax is imposed in Toronto. A land transfer tax is only
paid when an individual purchases a house. It is not paid if the house does not change hands.
As a stylised description of this tax, suppose that the amount τ is collected from the entrant if he
purchases the incumbent’s house and moves to Toronto, but not otherwise.
16 This

model could easily be extended to consider moves within Toronto as well. However, since our data do not
track buyer and seller locations, we do not pursue this investigation.
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Let τ denote a land transfer tax. Just as without the LTT, the incumbent captures all of the
surplus. Thus the equilibrium price must solve u TE − p T − τ = uS − pS so that p T = u TE − τ. The

incumbent chooses to sell if and only if doing so makes him better off. That is, if and only if
p T + uS − pS > u TI . This condition holds if and only if u TE − τ > u TI . Thus we see that the land

transfer tax prevents beneficial trades that would occur in its absence.

It is also of interest to consider equilibrium behaviour in the presence of an ordinary property
tax. Suppose that property in Toronto is subject to an ordinary property tax, τo ∈ R+ , that must be

paid by the incumbent regardless of whether the property changes hands.17

In this case, if the incumbent captures all surplus from any real estate transaction, we have
u TE
pT

− pT = uS − pS so that pT = uTE . The incumbent is willing to sell at this price if and only if
− τ + uS − pS > uTI − τ. This condition holds if and only if uTE > uTI . Therefore, unlike the LTT,
exactly the same trades occur under an ordinary property tax as occur without any property tax at
all.
We now turn to welfare analysis. Define welfare, W, to be the sum of the utility levels of the
entrant and incumbent. Thus, W = u TE + uS if the entrant moves to Toronto and incumbent to the
suburbs, and W = u TI + uS otherwise. It follows that welfare is maximised if and only if the agent
who draws the best opportunity lives in Toronto. In an untaxed equilibrium and when there is
an ordinary property tax the agent who draws the best opportunity always locates in Toronto. It
follows that such equilibria are socially optimal. In the presence of a land transfer tax the market
allocation is not socially optimal. When property in Toronto is subject to a land transfer tax, an
entrant who draws an opportunity u TE ∈ (u TI ,u TI + τ ) does not move to Toronto. The resulting
welfare loss is u TE − u TI ∈ [0,τ ].
To use this intuition to estimate the loss of welfare caused by Toronto’s LTT, we must deal with
two complications. First, when the Toronto LTT was imposed an almost identical provincial LTT
was already in place, while the welfare loss calculated above results from increasing the LTT from
zero to τ. To correctly reflect this situation, let τO denote the old or pre-existing provincial LTT.
A marginal transaction is one for which u TE lies in the interval [u TI + τO , u TI + τO + τ ]. Such a
transaction occurs before the new Toronto LTT, but not after, and entails a welfare loss of u TE − u TI ∈
[τO , τO + τ ]. That is, the magnitude of the welfare loss associated with each marginal foregone
transaction is at least equal to the old tax, and is no greater than the sum of the two taxes.
The second complication we must overcome is that, while we are able to estimate the frequency
of foregone transactions resulting from Toronto’s LTT, we do not observe utility levels associated
with foregone transactions. To overcome this problem, we use our assumption that u TE and u TI are
independent draws from a uniform distribution on [u, u]. In this case, the welfare loss of each
foregone transaction is the expected value of u TE − u TI , conditional on the transaction not occurring
only because of the new LTT.
Figure 6 illustrates the space of possible draws of u TE and u TI . The shaded triangle describes
pairs (u TE ,u TI ) for which transactions occur before and after the imposition of the Toronto LTT. The
unshaded region describes pairs (u TE ,u TI ) for which transactions do not occur before or after the
17 Our

conclusions are unchanged if we require the incumbent to pay the property tax if he stays in Toronto and the
Entrant to pay if he locates in Toronto.
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Figure 6. Equilibrium location decisions before and after an increase in the LTT from τO to τO + τ.
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new tax. The two hatched areas describe transactions foregone because of the Toronto LTT. This is
the region of the utility space where transactions occur before the new tax, but not after.
Since we have assumed that pairs (u TE ,u TI ) are uniformly distributed, the probability of drawing

a pair (u TE ,u TI ) that results in a transaction before the land transfer tax is
Area of 4 ACD
.
[ u − u ]2

Similarly, the probability of drawing a pair (u TE ,u TI ) that results in a transaction after the land
transfer tax is
Area of 4 ABE
.
[ u − u ]2

We estimate that the LTT causes about a 14% decline in the number of transactions. In the context
of figure 6, this is the conditional probability of a transaction not occurring with the LTT given that
it would have occurred without. Under our assumption of uniformity, this conditional probability
is the ratio of the area of ♦ BCDE to 4 ACD. Thus we have

Area of ♦ BCDE
= 0.14
Area of 4 ACD

Since the two triangles 4 ABE and 4 ACD are right-angled and isosceles, and since we know that
the distance | BC | = τ, it follows that u − τO ≈ 13.77τ.18
18 This

ratio may be written

A little algebra gives the desired result.

1
1 1
2
2 (u − τ ) − 2 (u − τ
1
2
2 (u − τ )
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− τ0 )2

= 0.14.

It is now straightforward to calculate the two conditional probabilities,
h
i
Prob (u TE ,u TI ) ∈ ♦ BFDE| (u TE ,u TI ) ∈ ♦ BCDE ≈ 0.962
and,
h
i
Prob (u TE ,u TI ) ∈ 4 BCF | (u TE ,u TI ) ∈ ♦ BCDE ≈ 0.038.
These probabilities are, respectively, the probability that the utility levels for a foregone transaction
lie in the region ♦ BFDE and 4 ACD.

It remains to calculate the expected value of u TE − u TI conditional on the associated transaction

not occurring because of the Toronto LTT. First note that, conditional on such a foregone transaction
falling in ♦ BCDE, E(u TE − u TI ) = τO + τ/2.
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Similarly, conditional on a foregone transaction

falling in 4 BCF, it is not difficult to show that E(u TE − u TI ) = τO + τ/4.

It follows immediately that the expected welfare loss of a transaction foregone because of the

Toronto LTT is
∆W = τO + 0.038 × τ/4 + 0.962 × τ/2

= τO + 0.491τ.

In our sample the average Toronto LTT exaction is about 1.1%. This is almost identical to the
provincial LTT exaction. The value of an average house in Toronto is about $ 400,000. Thus, we
estimate that τO = τ = $4,400. Substituting into the expression above, we estimate that the welfare
loss from each transaction foregone because of the Toronto LTT at $ 6,559.
The average annual number of transactions recorded in our data for 2004-2006 is about 21,200
for Toronto. Multiplying 21,200 by the estimated 14 percent effect of the LTT gives us a decrease of
about 3,000 in the number of single-family homes sold in an average year in Toronto. Multiplying
this number by the welfare loss associated with each transaction gives a total welfare loss of 19.5
million dollars.
Three comments are in order. First, the MLS reflects many, but not all single family home sales.
While no definitive estimates of the share of transactions covered by the MLS are available, our best
guess is that these data record about 85 percent of total single-family-home sales. Our estimate of
the cost of the LTT is low because it does not reflect all single family home sales, and because it
does not reflect condominium sales.
Second, our estimate is made under the seemingly strong assumption that utility levels are
drawn from a uniform distribution. In fact, while this assumption is dramatically easier to work
with than others we considered, the final estimate of the welfare loss does not appear to be
especially sensitive to this assumption. Using different distributional assumptions principally
19 From

figure 6, we have
1
τ (u − τ − τ0 − u)
τ
= τ0 + 2 .
2



E u TE − u TI |(u TE ,u TI ) ∈ ♦EBFD =
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Z u−τ0 −τ Z x +τ0 +τ
u

x +τ0

(y − x )dydx

serves to affect the expectation of u TE − u TI conditional on a foregone transaction. Under current

assumptions, this expectation evaluates to τO + 0.491τ. Under other distributional assumptions,
this expectation is bounded by τO below and τO + τ above. The lower bound is obtained if every
foregone transaction is exactly as costly as the worst transaction that could occur without the
Toronto LTT, and the upper bound is obtained if every foregone transaction is exactly as costly
as the best transaction that is foregone because of the LTT.

Third, it is important to note that an LTT is a tax on property just as is an ordinary property
tax. Therefore, to the extent that an ordinary property tax distorts a consumer’s choice of land
and housing capital, so does an LTT. Thus, the LTT truly appears to be dominated by an ordinary
property tax. All of the distortions caused by an ordinary property tax are also caused by an LTT,
but the disincentive for moving is unique to the LTT.

9. Conclusions
Using data that describe 139,266 single family home sales, we exploit a natural experiment to
estimate the effects of a new LTT on Toronto’s real estate market. Consistent with our intuition that
an LTT operates as a tax on moving, we find that Toronto’s tax decreases the volume of real estate
transaction by about 14%. That is, Toronto’s LTT leads to a 14% decrease in residential mobility. We
also find that the LTT is approximately fully capitalised into land prices.
The theoretical framework we develop makes our intuition about the effects of the LTT precise
and offers a way to calculate the welfare loss associated with Toronto’s LTT. This welfare loss,
effectively the cost of foregone mobility, is substantial, about 1$ for every 8$ in tax revenue raised
or about 19 million dollars per year for Toronto. In contrast, an ordinary property tax has no impact
on mobility, and therefore avoids the excess burden associated with the LTT.
Land transfer taxes are pervasive. In particular , they are used by national or sub-national
governments in Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This
analysis has immediate policy implications for these jurisdictions. In particular, that welfare would
be improved by shifting the burden of public finance from land transfer taxes to ordinary property
taxes.
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10. Appendix: Construction of figures 1 and 2
Top panel figure 1:
This figure is based on 67,502 transaction that occur during a pre-LTT period from February to
August of 2007 and a post-LTT period during the corresponding months of 2008. After consolidating a small number of postal codes with centroids exactly the same distance from the border,
these transactions give us 32,818 postal codes for which we can count transactions before and after
the LTT. For each postal code we calculate the raw change in the number of transactions (since
many postal codes do not record a transaction before the LTT, calculating the percentage change
in transaction entails dropping postal codes). This results in a set of 32,818 postal code changes in
transaction volumes. We drop postal codes further than ten kilometres from the border, leaving us
with 19,466.
The top panel of figure 1 is a lowess plot of the way these changes in transactions vary as the
distance to the Toronto border varies. Dotted lines are constructed by bootstrapping this lowess
estimation and show 95% and 5% pointwise confidence bounds.
Bottom panel figure 1:
This figure is based on 45,856 transaction that occur within five kilometres of the Toronto border
between January 2005 and August 2008. For each month during this time period, we calculate the
number of transactions on each side of the border. From this, we calculate
Toronto monthly transactions − Suburban monthly transactions
× 100,
Toronto monthly transactions
which yields a sequence describing the percentage change in price across the municipal border for
44 months.
The bottom panel of figure 1 plots these 44 points. Since we are able to display the universe of
data (rather than an estimated mean), we do not provide confidence bounds. Thus, for December
of 2007 we see that about 45% more transactions occurred in the five kilometre band inside of the
border than in the five kilometre band outside.
Top panel figure 2:
This figure is based on 67,502 transaction that occur during a pre-LTT period from February to August of 2007 and a post-LTT period during the corresponding months of 2008. After consolidating
a small number of postal codes with centroids exactly the same distance from the border, these
transactions give us 32,818 postal codes for which can observe transactions before and after the
LTT .

For each postal code we calculate the percentage change in transaction price,
Post-LTT price - Pre-LTT price
× 100.
Pre-LTT price

Since this quantity is undefined if there are zero transactions in a postal code pre-LTT, we are left
with a set of 5,464 postal codes for which we observe percentage change in price that occurs around
the inception of the LTT.
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The top panel of figure 2 is a lowess plot of the way these changes in prices are distributed across
space, as the distance to the Toronto border varies. Dotted lines are constructed by bootstrapping
this lowess estimation and show 95% and 5% pointwise confidence bounds.
Bottom panel figure 2:
This figure is based on 45,856 transaction that occur within five kilometres of the Toronto border
between January 2005 and August 2008. For each month during this time period, we calculate the
monthly average transaction price for each side of the border. From this we calculate
Toronto monthly mean transaction price − Suburban monthly mean transaction price
× 100,
Toronto monthly mean transaction price
which yields a sequence describing the percentage change in price across the municipal border for
44 months.
The bottom panel of figure 1 plots these 44 points. Since we are able to display the universe of
data (rather than an estimated mean), we do not provide confidence bounds. Thus, for December
of 2007 we see that the average house sold for about 15% more in Toronto than in the suburbs.
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